





I\MINTER 19811Gary C. Zimmerman*
The pricing and access provisions ofthe De-
pository Institutions Deregulation and Mone-
tary Control Act of 1980 (MCA) require
Federal Reserve Banks to begin imposing
explicit charges for the correspondent-banking
services they ofTer. The Act also provides for
access by all depository institutions to major
Fed services: check clearing and collection,
automated clearinghouse transfers, wire trans-
fers, coin and currency, settlement, and
securities safekeeping. Previously, these ser-
vices had been restricted largely to member
banks. Implementation of the Act's pricing
and access provisions during the 1981-82
period thus will bring about a major restructur-
ing of correspondent-banking markets. Still,
after implementation, Federal Reserve Banks
will probably maintain their position as pri-
mary suppliers of major correspondent-bank-
ing services.
The MCA's pricing and access provisions
are aimed at improving the markets for corres-
pondent-banking services in two major ways.
First, the Act seeks to promote increased com-
petition by requiring Federal Reserve Banks to
charge all users of Fed services an amount
equal to their cost. This would change the
Fed's former service policy - supplying ser-
vices free-of-charge to member banks while
denying access to non-members - which
tended to restrict and distort competition from
the private sector. Second, the Act seeks to
correct inefficiencies in the production and
distribution ofcorrespondent-banking services
fostered by the Fed's former policy practice of
providing free services to members. This prac-
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tice often led Reserve Banks to produce at
higher marginal costs than their private com-
petitors, which raised the total cost of corres-
pondent services to society and stimulated
overconsumption ofsuch services.
This paper examines the impact of MCA
pricing and access provisions onthe market for
correspondent-banking services. It raises the
question: to what extent will these provisions
enhance competition and improve market effi-
ciency? Also, after the implementation of
MCA, will Federal Reserve Banks be able to
compete with private banks providing these
services?
We begin with a description of the market
for correspondent-banking services (Section
n. Next we explain MCA's pricing and access
provisions (Section II), and analyze how these
may improve competition and efficiency in
these markets (Section III). However, the final
results will depend critically upon the Reserve
Banks' ability to produce services comparable
to those provided by the private sector, at
competitive costs. Estimates of the cost func-
tions facing Reserve Banks (Section IV) sug-
gest that the System will be quite competitive
in providing check-clearing services - and
that it may dominate the market for auto-
mated-clearinghouse transfers because ofsub-
stantial economies ofscale. Taken as a whole,
the evidence suggests that the MCA will sig-
nificantly alter existing patterns ofuse of cor-
respondent and Reserve Bank services. The
potential benefits in terms of increased com-
petition and enhanced efficiency appear to be
substantial, despite the continued existence of
several features ofthe pre-MeA environment.I. Featuresof the Correspondent Banking System
The actions of several types of institutions
define the correspondent-banking system's
role in the nation's payments mechanism and
financial structure. The nation's central bank,
the Federal Reserve, plays a prominent role as
a supplier of certain correspondent-banking
services, such as check-clearing and coin-and-
currency services. Many large member banks,
called correspondent banks, supply these and
other banking services to smaller banks, called
respondents - in addition to providing for
their own operations. In some situations cor-
respondents provide these services internally,
while in others they rely on other correspon-
dents or on Federal Reserve Banks for ser-
vices. Smaller banks have often contracted ser-
vices out, because of the greater cost of pro-
viding services internally, in relation to using
"free" Federal Reserve services or purchasing
services from correspondent banks.
Both private correspondent banks and the
Federal Reserve System have long supplied
certain correspondent-banking services -
funds transfers, check clearing and settlement,
and provision of coin and currency. In some
cases the services are complementary, as in
automated clearinghouse (ACH) operations,
where correspondent banks handle the pre-
paration of tapes necessary for the electronic
transfers, while the transfers themselves are
usually cleared and settled through the net-
work ofACH facilities operated by the Federal
Reserve. In most cases, however, the services
offered by both the private sector and the
Reserve Banks are close substitutes.
In the pre-MCA environment, Federal
Reserve Banks provided correspondent ser-
vices to member banks free of charge. But
non-member banks, being denied direct access
to these services, had to produce them inter-
nally or rely on (member) private correspon-
dents.! This policy was designed to induce
member banks to remain in the system. In
effect, the free provision of services partially
compensated member banks for the burden
on their earnings represented by the require-
ment that their reserves be held as vault cash
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or as non-interest-bearing deposits with
Federal Reserve Banks.
Yetdespite the availability ofsubsidized Fed
services, many member banks (particularly
smaller ones) relied heavily on the morecostly
services provided by private correspondents.
Several factors affected each bank's decision to
use public or private correspondent services,
including:
1. Relative prices charged by various public
and private suppliers;
2. Perceived differences in the quality of
comparable services, such as faster ser-
vice, earlier availability of funds, later
deadlines, etc.;
3. Relative costs incurred by respondents.
For example, costs associated with
encoding or sorting checks to meet
Reserve Bank specifications and/or
higher reserve-balance adjustment costs
related to use of Reserve Bank services
may be more expensive than sorting or
reserve-adjustment costs associated with
using correspondent services.
These three factors will continue to in-
fluence bank decisions under the MCA, but
the Act itself will influence the choices made,
primarily by altering relative price relations.
Prior to the implementation of MCA, many
small member banks purchased services from
correspondents despite the availability of free
Federal Reserve services, because the benefits
of free services failed to offset quality and/or
preparation-cost differentials. In fact, several
studies suggest that the Federal Reserve was
relatively unsuccessful in competing for the
business of small banks; for example, from
one-half to one~third of small member banks
relied on correspondents for all their check-
clearing services. 2Theability ofprivate corres-
pondents to offer tailored services, designed to
meet the needs of selected customers, may
account for some of their success, as it pro-
vided them with a niche in the market not
covered by "standard" Federal Reserve ser-
vices.Services Available
Comparisons ofReserve Bank services with
those provided by correspondents should help
determine the direction ofpost-MCAmarkets.
In a broad sense, most private services are
comparable to services supplied by Reserve
Banks, yet differences exist among correspon-
dent services, and also between correspondent
and Reserve Bank services. These differences
reflect variations in marketing procedures, ser-
vice standards, and pricing practices. Price
comparisons can be inexact because of the
existence of different pricing practices among
correspondents - and because of the
widespread correspondent practice of reselling
Federal Reserve services. This practice may
dramatically alter correspondent fee structures
once Reserve Banks begin pricing their ser-
vices. 3
Check clearing and settlement refer to the
entire process for transferring checking and
NOW account funds between economic
agents. This process is essential for the swift
and reliable transfer offunds. Itencompasses a
number of steps, including the encoding of
transaction information on checks, presorting
by type and by destination, microfilming for
records purposes, transportation, sorting by
bank for payment and settlement, and the
actual clearing among banks or clearing-house
members.
Checks may take several routes in the clear-
ing process, but roughly 45 percent ofthe total
are cleared through the Federal Reserve
System's check-processing facilities. 4 Prior to
the implementation of the MCA, most (but
not all) member banks presented at least some
checks at their local Reserve Banks for clearing
and settlement. Non-member banks - lacking
access to Reserve Bank clearing services ---
and many small member banks meanwhile
relied on the check-processing services pro-
vided by correspondent banks. Many ofthese
correspondents also used Reserve Bank
facilities to clear both their own and their res-
pondents' checks. Hence, correspondent
check-clearing costs can be expected to




transfer funds electronically. In this system, a
central computer accepts and executes the
electronic messages (generally provided from
computer tape) that are necessary for a
"paperless" transfer of funds. At present the
Federal Reserve System provides the only
nationwide ACH network, clearing nearly all
ACH transfers outside ofNew York City. The
Federal Reserve System has actively promoted
ACH's, hoping to increase the efficiency of
the mechanism by reducing its
reliance on the traditional paper check.
However, most ACH transfers - over 80 per-
cent of the total - continue to be Govern-
ment-related payments.s
In an initial stage, correspondents generally
prepare tapes containing the debit, credit and
account information necessary to transfer
funds through an ACH. Then Reserve Banks,
using the tapes provided by commercial banks,
provide further processing and then clear and
settle the electronic transfers among local
ACH members. Thus, Reserve Bank costs
reflect primarily clearing and settlement costs,
while correspondent fees cover handling and
preparation costs. Because the services are
complementary rather than competing, direct
per unit fees for correspondents' ACH services
are not comparable with Reserve Bank costs.
Another major service involves the provi-
sion and receipt ofcoin and/or currency to and
from banks. Here again, Reserve Bank ser-
vices partly complement, and partly substitute
for, those provided by correspondent banks.
Both Reserve Banks and correspondents pro-
vide central cash vaults for safekeeping, as well
as handling, verification, and packaging ser-
vices. However, the Federal Reserve also pro-
vides services, such as the replacement and
destruction of coin and currency, that reflect
its role as the nation's central bank. Further-
more, as with check services, some correspon-
dents rely on Reserve Banks to fill their coin
and currency orders. Hence, the cost of such
correspondent services can also be expected to
increase once the Federal Reserve begins
charging for its own services.
Correspondent banks in the past had troublecompeting with the Federal Reserve, which
provided a subsidy to member banks in the
form of "free" correspondent services. Seg-
mentation of the market into two groups of
banks, some with access and some without
access to "free" Reserve Bank services, meant
that nonmembers had to rely on correspon-
dents for their correspondent-banking ser-
vices.
II. New Direction for Correspondent Banking
The pricing and access provisions of the
Monetary Control Act established the direc-
tion offuture development in the markets for
correspondent-banking services. The Act
required the Federal Reserve to publish a set
of pricing principles and a proposed schedule
offees by September 1980. At set times during
1981 and early 1982, the Reserve Banks are
beginning to price individual services, using
fee schedules based on the pricing principles
announced in 1980.
The passage of the MCA was a major
breakthrough in the rationalization ofthe cor-
respondent-banking system. The reserve-
requirement changes it mandates should sub-
stantially equalize the burden of holding
reserves among all depository institutions (see
the article by Michael Klein in this Review). In
addition, it opens the door to equal treatment
of all institutions with respect to pricing and
access of Federal Reserve services.
The Act requires pricing for a number of
correspondent services (including Federal
Reserve float) formerly provided for free or at
a nominal cost by Reserve Banks. The four
major services considered here - check clear-
ing and collection, automated clearinghouse
transfers, coin services, and currency services
- account for nearly 80 percent ofall Federal
Reserve System costs ofproviding correspon-
dent-banking services (Table 1).
In the words ofthe Monetary Control Act: 6
The schedule of fees prescribed pursuant to
this section shall be based on the following
principles:
(l) All Federal Reserve bank services
covered by the fee schedule shall be priced
explicitly.
(2) All Federal Reserve bank services
covered by the fee schedule shall be available
to nonmember depository institutions and
such services shall be priced at the same fee
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schedule applicable to member banks, except
that nonmembers shall be subject to any
other terms, including a requirement of bal-
ances sufficient for clearing purposes, that
the Board may determine are applicable to
member banks.
(3) Over the long run, fees shall be estab-
lished on the basis of all direct and indirect
costs actually incurred in providing the
Federal Reserve services priced, including
interest on items credited prior to actual col-
lection, overhead, and an allocation of
imputed costs which takes into account the
taxes that would have been paid and the
return on capital that would have been pro-
vided had the services been furnished by a
private business firm, except that the pricing
principles shall give due regard to competi-
tive factors and the provision ofan adequate
level ofsuch services nationwide.
(4) Interest on items credited prior to collec-
tion shall be charged at the current rate
applicable in the market for Federal funds.
Pricing will eliminate the major subsidy the
Federal Reserve formerly provided to institu-
tions using its services. Prices are to be set so
that all long-run costs incurred by a private
competitor will be included in the costs that
Reserve Banks must cover. This means that
Reserve Bank prices, in principle, shall take





- Imputed return to capital
Covering all of these costs eliminates the
major competitive advantage formerly held by
Reserve Banks in providing free services to
member banks.
Under the MCA, Federal Reserve prices
may be set at several levels ofoperations, the
only constraint being that revenues generatedfrom each service cover the full cost ofprovid-
ing the service. Thus, prices may be set at a
national level (such as the proposed prices for
ACH transfers), or at a District level (such as
prices for check, coin and currency services in
certain areas), or at the zone or office level.8
Variations at the district or office level would
allow price schedules to reflect regional
differences in costs ofproviding services. Cor-
respondent banks as well as Reserve Banks
may encounter such differences because of
regional variations in wages and salaries, as
well as transportation expenses.
Federal Reserve guidelines also require
Reserve Banks to treat differentiated services
within a product line as separate services for
pricing purposes. For example, checks will be
separated into several categories, depending
upon the cost of processing and transporting
various types of checks. This treatment is
necessary if Reserve Banks hope to be com-
petitive in the check-clearing area. For ACH
operations, however, where a standardized
national market exists, a single price will
suffice for all local ACH transfers.
The MCA was designed, through a restruc-
turing of the system, to improve the competi-
tive position of private banks selling corres-
pondent-banking services. Obviously, in the
pre-MCA world these correspondents were at
a severe disadvantage when competing for the
business of member banks, since the latter
already had access to free Federal Reserve ser-
vices. Pricing Reserve Bank services at "cost"
thus will allow a significant increase in com-
petition from correspondents, who will be able
to compete on price as well as the quality of
services.
Competition also should be encouraged by
the provision authorizing access to Reserve
Bank services for nonmember banks and other
nonbank depository institutions. Competition
from Reserve Banks for such customers opens
this segment ofthe market to competition; for-
merly, this market was served only by corres-
pondents.
Federal Reserve Expenditures
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'Includes ACH expenditures, and estimated overhead for Electronic Funds Transfers that should be allocated to ACH
operations. tNon-governmental expenses.
Source: 1979 PACS Annual Detail Expense Report; and J979 PACS Summary Expense Report, Board ofGovernors of
the Federal Reserve System, 1980.
26III. Pricing and Efficient Allocation of Services
Free Federal Reserve services represented a
major source of inefficiency in the correspon-
dent-banking system prior to implementation
of the MCA's pricing and access provisions.
First, this situation led to overconsumption of
Fed services by member banks. Also, by caus-
ing the overproduction of publicly produced
correspondent services, this pricing policy
resulted in an inefficient allocation of
resources.
What are the necessary conditions for effi-
cient production and consumption? First, effi-
cient production requires that the cost of the
last unit produced (i.e. the marginalcost ofpro-
duction) be equal for all suppliers. Otherwise,
the total industry output obtainedfrom a given
amount of resources could be increased by
shifting production from high-cost to low-cost
producers. Second, efficient consumption
requires that each user ofa service pay a price
equal to the marginal cost of producing it. If,
for example, the price charged were set below
the marginal cost, individuals would be led to
over-consume the service, in the sense that its
worth to them would fall short of its
(marginal) cost to society as a whole. Hence,
efficient production and consumption requires
that all firms incur thesame marginal costs and
that all users pay thesame price for agiven ser-
vice. Neither of these conditions held true in
the pre-MCA environment.
The Federal Reserve's practice of charging
less than marginal cost led to overconsump-
tion of its services. That is, respondent and
correspondent banks in the aggregate used far
more "free" Federal Reserve services than
they would ifthey had had to pay full cost for
them. This represented a waste of resources,
because the worth ofthe services to users was
then less than their actual cost to society.
Overconsumption resulted from the gap be-
tween the Reserve Bank's marginal cost of
production (some positive number) and the
fee it charged for use of those services
(typically zero).
For similar reasons, production inefficien-
cies also occurred in the pre-MCA era. In this
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situation, member banks naturally increased
their demand for "free" Federal Reserve ser-
vices while reducing their demand for other
privately-supplied services. Reserve Banks
therefore produced relatively more services,
and correspondents relatively fewer services,
than they would if Reserve Banks had based
their prices on actual costs. Thus, as suggested
below, Reserve banks often produced at
higher marginal costs than their private com-
petitors. To the extent this was true, resources
could have been saved by reallocating produc-
tion from Reserve Banks to lower-cost private
producers.
Production of correspondent services may
also have been misallocated among Reserve
Bank facilities. Efficient production ofservices
requires that the difference between marginal
costs be no greater than the cost oftransporta-
tion between competing facilities. Otherwise,
the costs of producing and delivering a given
service could be reduced by shifting produc-
tion among facilities. Even with efficient pro-
duction, local or regional factors could lead to
variations in marginal production costs with-
out necessarily implying inefficiency in the
production of a particular service. (These
regional factors include state branch-banking
laws, regional cost-of-living factors, and other
geographic considerations.) In the pre-MCA
environment, however, Reserve Bank
facilities had an incentive to produce up to the
quantity demanded at the zero price, but no
incentive to equalize marginal costs (less
transportation expenses) across facilities. As a
result, production at some Reserve Bank
facilities probably could have been more effi-
ciently produced at other (or new) facilities.
This may indeed have been the case, as we can
see from the following discussion ofestimated
long-run average cost curves for various cor-
respondent services.
MeA implementation will promote effi-
ciency by instituting full-cost pricing, but the
Act will not eliminate all of the inefficiencies
associated with the present system. Prices
under the MCA will be determined by currentaverage (rather than marginal) costs of pro-
duction. Pricing at marginal cost would elimi-
nate the gap between the price private institu-
tions pay for services and the production costs
incurred by Reserve Bank facilities in produc-
ing the last unit ofservice. Long-run average-
cost pricing will significantly reduce the gap
between the price correspondents pay and the
cost of producing these services. But this
approach, unlike marginal-cost pricing, will
not completely close the gap unless the ser-
vices are produced at constant costs - which
(as noted below) does not appear to be the
case.
Continued inefficiencies also will arise from
the proposed pricing procedure for ACH and
coin-and-currency services. Reserve Banks
will price only coin-and-currency transporta-
tion and coin-wrapping services. (They will
continue to provide administrative and han-
dling functions for free, however, since these
functions may be considered a governmental
responsibility, although correspondents also
provide these services in many cases.) The
Fed proposes to set ACH fees at an estimated
long-run average-cost level that is considera-
bly below the present level of costs. As the
volume of ACH transfers rises over time, sig-
nificant economics ofscale could lead to a sub-
stantial reduction in the cost per ACH transfer.
The Federal Reserve thus has set its proposed
price to approximate long-run average cost at a
mature output level.
Other factors - market size, geographic
location of facilities, competitive factors, and
economies of scale - may all affect the effi-
ciency of Reserve Bank facilities under the
MCA's pricing and access provisions. Scale
economies, or diseconomies in particular, may
profoundly affect a Reserve Bank's market
share. For example, some offices are currently
operating either off of the estimated long-run
average-cost curve, or at a volume considera-
bly above or below that at which average cost is
minimized. In the long-run, MCA pricing cre-
ates incentives for those facilities to move
toward a more efficient scale ofoperations. For
example, large-volume producers operating in
the region of decreasing returns to scale will
incur higher average costs, and this will lead to
higher prices, making these facilities less com-
petitive vis-a-vis correspondents. Higher rela-
tive prices will cause Reserve Banks to lose
customers, and this process will tend to return
these facilities to a level ofoutput that minim-
izes minimum average cost.
IV. Estimating long-RunAverage Costand Average Prices
The future of the correspondent-banking
industry largely depends upon the state of
competition between private producers and
the largest single seller of correspondent ser-
vices, the Federal Reserve System. The
Reserve Banks' ability to compete and their
ultimate share of the market will hinge·on
answers to three related questions. First, do
economies of scale allow the high-volume
facilities operated by the Federal Reserve
System to produce services more efficiently
than private competitors? Second, in the pre-
MCA environment, how did the average cost
of Fed services compare with the fees set by
private correspondents? The answer will be
critical in determining how Reserve Banks will
fare in the short run. Finally, how do the
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average costs of facilities compare with the
estimated minimum average cost? This com-
parison will provide an indication of the
Federal Reserve's ability to compete in the
long-run.
Scale Economies
These questions can be analyzed in terms of
the long-run average-cost relationship - the
relationship between the average cost of pro-
duction for each Federal Reserve facility and
the level of production at that facility. The
typical long-run average-cost curve is U-
shaped, with each ofthe curve's three regions
exhibiting a different relationship between
average cost and output (Figure 1).
In the first region, the curve is downwardFigure 1
Standard Long-Run Average Cost Curve
(1)
Reserve involvement in correspondent bank-
ing.9
Economies ofscale, to the extent they exist,
could help determine the future distribution of
production between the Federal Reserve and
the private sector. Increasing returns to scale
could indeed give Reserve Banks a competi-
tive advantage. Iftechnology is relatively con-
sistent across Reserve Bank facilities, increas-
ing returns to scale would allow offices to
increase output more than proportionately
each time inputs are
increasing returns to scale can often lead to the
establishment of a natural monopoly - a
single firm that accounts for all or nearly all of
an industry's output. (Public utilities, with
their large fixed capital investment, typically
fall into this category.) This raises the question
whether the Federal Reserve System's large
volume of services makes it a lower-cost pro-
ducer than correspondent banks, and thus
justifies the System's disproportionate share of
the production ofcorrespondent services.
These propositions can be tested by estimat-
ing the long-run average-cost function - the
long-run relation between a facility's average
cost per unit of service supplied and its total
costs for that service. 10 We estimatedthis func-
tion from Federal Reserve actual cost and out-
put data for each facility, derived largely from
the System's Planning and Control System of
accounting (PACS). The data provide several
alternative measures ofaverage cost, depend-
ing on whether transportation and overhead
costs are included.ll The measures used here
for check and ACH operations include both
transportation and estimated overhead
expenses. For coin and currency services, the
average-cost measure includes estimated over-
head expenses but excludes transportation
expenses. For all services, similar
results were found with alternative measures
of average cost.
The general functional form of the esti-
mated average-cost relation can be written as:





















sloping, with the long-run average cost per
unit of output falling as the volume of output
increases. Economies of scale exist in this
region, related to increased efficiency from
larger-scale operations and/or the ability to
spread fixed overhead over a larger number of
units of output. In the second region, the
curve is horizontal, with changes in output
having no impact on the average cost per unit.
Average costs are at a minimum in this con-
stant-cost portion of the curve, so that a firm
will seek to have each ofits facilities operate in
this region. The third region is upward sloping,
with diseconomies of scale. In this range of
output, further increases in volume lead to
increases in the average cost per unit. This
may occur for a number ofreasons, including
the difficulty ofmanaging and operating large-
scale facilities. In the case ofpublicly produced
and subsidized services, inappropriate pricing
policies may lead to overuse and overproduc-
tion of services, driving average costs above
the minimum level.
Superficially, production ofFederal Reserve
services appears to fit themold ofadecreasing-
cost activity. The Federal Reserve is the
largest single producer, nearly monopolizing
production ofmany correspondent services, as
its offices provide the major links in the
nation's payments mechanism. Indeed, most
Reserve banks, branches and offices operate at
a relatively high volume of output, and many
observers thus point to economies of scale as
the explanation for the level of Federal
29mc:ufl:ed for any given volume of activity. In
other words, facilities located in regions with
higher salary levels, all otherfactors equal, will
incur higher average costs than facilities in
low-salary areas. For this reason, we included a
variable measuring the relative level of salary
rates for each facility (relative to the
average) .12
Finally, branch-banking restrictions, an
important regulatory constraint, could also in-
average cost by facility. Branching
restri,;t1c)fiS alter the structure of the bal1lklrlg
market in a way that could result in increased
utilization of Reserve Bank services. In states
that restrict banks to a single operating unit,
average costs per unit may be higher because
Federal Reserve offices must provide services
to a large number ofsmall, geographically dis-
persed institutions. In states where branch
banking is authorized, the large branch
systems must provide many correspondent
services for their branch offices directly,
because cannot on Reserve Banks to
intrabank operations. In this manner,
branch banks may internalize many high-
cost correspondent-banking operations.
Branch banking, by reducing the proportion of
num-co:st services provided by Reserve Banks,
thus could reduce the average costs ofaffected
Reserve in relation to those incurred
Fed facilities in unit-banking states.
However, the branching variables (tested in
dummy variable form) were not statistically
significant, and so were dropped from the re-
ported equations. 13
For each service, we selected a best equation
from the possible combination ofindependent
variables listed in the general equation. The
simplified equations included measures of
volume, as well as other factors (where suita-
ble were that to
the explanatory power of the equation (see
Table
Long-run Average Cost Curves
If of scale actually exist for
Reserve Bank facilities, then we would expect
to find a downward-sloping long-run average
cost curve - rather than the traditional U-










AC = average cost
V = volume service produced




lurlctlon, essentially a quadratic rela-
tion between average cost and volume, is
"shifted" by certain regional conditions such
as mix or rates (SAL).
This thus allows the
average costs decrease
increase with and allows also
ste,adlJly decI'ea:sing average costs. exact
curve, and the
We terms to account
for the factors on variations
in average costs for given levels ofoutput.
example, check-clearing operations generally
involve a mixofservices in sense that some
types ofchecks cost considerably more to pro-
cess than others. offices a
relatively
should, all other factors
average costs than offices
since
account for a major
costs of <:Pf'V;"P<:
REG = and market charac-
teristics
This was with cross-section
data on average cost, volume, and varia-
bles for Reserve Bank facilities for 1977. (An
alternative log-linear version of this function
was also estimated, but gave very similar
30collection operations. In actuality, we found
the reverse. The t-value of both volume
measures, and the product-mix factor measur-
ing the proportion of low-cost checks pro-
cessed, were statistically significant (Table 2).
Thus, 1977 cost and output data do notsup-
port the argument that check clearing is a
decreasing-cost activity for Reserve Bank
facilities. Furthermore, all of the largest
Reserve Bank operations were found along the
upward-sloping portion ofthe V-shaped curve
(see Chart 1). The estimatedcurve retained its
V-shape even after exclusion of Chicago and
New York, the two largest check-processing
centers. The shape ofthe curve, as well as the
location ofmany facilities, suggests that some
smaller operations still operated in the region
of increasing returns to scale. However, most
of the larger facilities operated at too large a
scale of operations, and thus produced check-
clearing services inefficiently. Humphrey
(1980) using a more sophisticated model,
::UC'" JHIHlar evidence regarding diseconomies
of scale. 14
For automated-clearinghouse operations, in
contrast, the estimated long-run average-cost








Eslimated Long Run Average Cost Curve
for Reserve Bank Facilities'
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'Long-run average cost for check operations
includes all production costs and estimated overhead
costs. The 16-percent mark-up is not included.
linear (Chart 2). This indicates that average
cost will decline as output rises,as found in
Humphrey's 1980 ACH study. is evidence
of economies of scale in ACH •. services -
which at present are almost entirely provided
by the Federal Reserve System - is consistent
with what might be expected in a developing
Table 2




Check 2.214 -.20iO x IO-s
Processed (¢) 05.93) (-2.96)
ACHlmage 9.768 -.7388 x 10-3
Processed (¢) (1237) (-2.90)
Strap of
Currency+ -i3.41 -.i526 x 10-2
Processed (¢) (-92) (-127)
Thousand
Pieces of -.2219 -.1874 x 10-4













SAL WRAP r vations Error Cost
.343 48 2578 1.609
.163 39t 3.124 7.997
+45.49 .226 37 5.962 24.67
(284)
+46.77 +t7.46 .354 37 14.10 33.60
(I.26) (356)
* Does not include 16-percent markup.
+ Excluding transportation and shipping costs, which may vary significantly wilh the geographic area covered by each facility.
tExciudes Denver because of data problems.
V = Output or units ofservice produced
V2 = V x V
PMLC = Product-mix variable. For check clearing, it refers to the proportion of low-cost checks processed by
SAL = Salary-adjustment factor.
WRAP = Facilities providingcoin wrappingservices (I3 of371. Dummy Variable.
31Cost
30 Estimated Long Run Average Cost Curve
for Reserve Bank Facilities'
Chart 3
Currency Services
'Long-run average cost for currency services
excludes shipping and transportation expenses,
which may vary significantly between districts. All
other production costs and estimated overhead are
included in long-run average cost. The 16-percent
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(Chart 3). However, diseconomies of scale
were evident only at the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, the System's largest producer,
which provides nearly three times the volume
of the next largest facility. If the New York
operation is excluded, then the shape of the
curve changes considerably, and some other
large facilities also find themselves operating
with diseconomies of scale.
The estimated long-run average cost curve
for Reserve Bank coin-processing operations is
also V-shaped (Chart 4). Some facilities oper-
ate in each ofthe three ranges ofproduction -
falling, relatively constant, or increasing
average costs. Initially, average cost falls rather
sharply as output rises, and indeed most
Reserve Banks and their offices fall into this
range. However, the medium-volume offices
generally exhibit minimum average costs,
while the highest-volume offices exhibit
increasing average costs as volume rises.
Reserve Banks thus appear to operate with
significant economies of scale throughout the
present range ofproduction for ACH services,
but not for other services. Some check, and
some coin and currency, operations operate at
or near the estimated minimum average cost
associated with the long-run average cost
curve, while most smaller facilities could
benefit from increasing returns to scale by
expanding their output. In contrast, the largest
Estimated Long Run Average Cost Curve
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"Long-run average cost for ACH operations includes
all production costs and estimated overhead costs.
The 16-percent mark-up is not included.
industry. Italso provides empiricaljustification
for the Federal Reserve's decision to price
ACH services at an estimated average cost
based on a mature volume ofservices, rather
than on costs at the present output level.
The cost data used in the regressions for
coin and currency operations include the costs
of receiving, verifying, and shipping prepara-
tion, but exclude the actual costs ofshipping.
These costs are most comparable to the re-
ported fees charged by private correspondents,
which also typically exclude transportation
costs. But in a pricing environment, we should
remember, the Federal Reserve will continue
to provide non-transportation services without
charge. Accordingly, the estimates presented
here mainly indicate how well the Federal
Reserve would compete with the private sector
if it charged users for all costs incurred, as in
the case of other services.
The estimated long-run average cost curves
for both currency and coin operations included
both volume measures, which were
statistically significant in all cases. The relative
(SAL) was also included..In
addition, for coin services we included. a
dummy variable indicating whether a facility
offered wrapped coin or only bagged coin. The
estimates in Table 2 indicated higher average
costs for any given volume at facilities that
provided wrapping services.
The estimated long-run average cost curve
derived for currency sevices is V-shaped
32facilities all exhibit average costs above the
minimum in coin, currency and check-pro-
cessing operations. In addition, as their
volume increases, so does their average cost.
These findings refute the contention that
Reserve Banks have a natural monopoly posi-
tion by virtue ofeconomies ofscale in the pro-
duction of their correspondent-banking ser-
vices. Clearly, average cost does not continue
to fall as output rises for check, coin, and cur-
rency services. Since Reserve Banks do not
have natural monopolies, therefore, they can
expect to encounter substantial competition
from private suppliers even after the adjust-
ment to pricing is made - a subject to which
we shall now turn.
Price Comparisons
In the competitive atmosphere created by
the MCA, the relative prices charged by
Reserve Banks and private suppliers will be
crucial in determining whether banks will
purchase publicly- or privately-produced ser-
vices. Short-run cost figures provide an indica-
tion of how much the volume of Reserve
Bank services will rise or fall, relative to
others, in the immediate wake of pricing.
Long-run cost estimates give an indication of
the competitiveness of Reserve Bank services
following the initial adjustment to pricing and
open access.
The evidence suggests that Reserve Banks
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"Long-run average cost for coin services excludes
shipping and transportation expenses, which may
vary significantly between districts. All other produc-
tion costs and estimated overhead are included in
iong-run average cost. The i6-percent mark-up is not
included.
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clearing services at a cost comparable to, if
not below, the fees set by private-sector pro-
ducers. However, the data also suggest that the
costs of providing coin and currency services
are substantially higher for Reserve Banks
than for their private competitors. This implies
that Reserve Banks would have difficulty in
competing, at least initially, if they tried to
cover their full costs for these services -
although ofcourse they plan to charge only for
transportation services. We do not attempt to
compare and ACH services
because of the complementary, rather than
competitive, nature of Reserve Bank and cor-
respondent-bank services of this type.
We derived Reserve Bank "prices" for 1977
by summing aU direct and indirect production
costs, estimated overhead costs, and a 16-per-
cent markup to cover imputed taxes and the
return on capital. (The 16-percent figure is the
markup used by the Board in its most recent
pricing proposals.) We then compared these
"prices" with correspondent-bank prices
available from the 1977 Account Analysis
Survey ofthe Federal Reserve Bank ofKansas
City.16 The survey provides estimates, by
Federal Reserve District, on prices and/or
compensating-balance requirements of 149
large correspondent banks. Our comparison
(Table 3) indicates that Reserve Banks may
find significant competition from the private
sector after MCA implementation.
Check Pricing
The average (and modal) correspondent fee
for a "typical" check amounted to 2.0 cents
per item in 1977, compared to 1.87 cents per
checkfor the Federal Reserve's average cost,
overhead and markup (Table 3).
Despite considerable regional differences in
both Reserve Bank and correspondent prices,
the Reserve Banks' derived average-cost
prices were lower than average correspondent
fees in seven of twelve Federal Reserve Dis-
tricts. On a national basis, Reserve Banks thus
showed a slight advantage 1977, and
preliminary evaluation of 1979 data suggests
that the advantage has been maintained.
Clearing of correspondents' checks through
Federal Reserve facilities will become muchmore expensive once Reserve Banks begin
pricing check services. The increase incosts to
correspondents is likely to be passed along to
their customers. This factor of itself .will
increase the competitive advantage ofReserve
Banks.
On the other hand, the largest Reserve Bank
facilities suffer from operating in the region of
diseconomies of scale. Humphrey (Journal of
Bank Research, 1980) suggests that Reserve
Banks would be unable to expand into the
region ofdeclining operated in a
competitive environmentY Ifprices are set at
the District or office level, they would be dis-
advantaged to the extent their average costs
exceeded those of private suppliers. Over
time, however, competition should reduce the
scale of facilities operating above minimum
average costs, thus reducing their average
costs to a more competitive level.
Coin and Currency
Our average-cost measures for coin and cur-
rency services are not the same as those that
the Federal Reserve intends to use for pricing.
Rather, they represent the average cost ofhan-
dling cash, Le., handling and preparing it for
shipment, and handling and storing it after
receipt. The handling function is distinct from
the transportation function. After implemen-
tation ofthe MCA, in contrast, Reserve Banks
will begin pncmg two types of services -
transportation and shipping services, and coin-
wrapping services.
Handling costs nonetheless help provide
information on Reserve Banks' ability to pro-
vide non-transportation cash services on a
competitive basis with the private sector. On
the basis ofa comparison which excluded ship-
ping charges, we found that Reserve Bank
costs were approximately one and a halftimes
correspondent fees for coin-and-currency
handling services (Table 3).
These higher costs reflected the Federal
Reserve's governmental role. As the nation's
central bank, the Fed has a responsibility for
maintaining the quality of the nation's coin
and currency. Reserve Banks all require
storage and handling facilities for the new coin
and currency that they distribute. They also
have the task offiltering out unfit currency and
coins, not to mention counterfeits, and remov-
ing them from circulation. Consequently, we
cannot easily distinguish between the portion
of handling costs which is strictly related to
transferring cash between depository institu-
tions, and the portion which is strictly govern-
mental. This makes it difficult to determine
whether Reserve Banks would be able to com-
pete with private suppliers if they were to
charge for the former type ofservices.
Table 3
Reserve Bank Costs and Correspondent Fees
(Based on 1911 data, in cents)
Reserve Bank
Minimum Long-Run Correspondent
Cost1 Cost2 Average Fee3
Cost per
encoded check 1.87 1.69 2.00
Handling costs
Per roll of coin 3.85 n.a. 2.5
Per strap of currency 31.8 21.6 20.0
Transportation costs
Per roll of coin 1.0 n.a. n.a.
Per strap of currency 12.5 n.a. n.a.
1. Long-run average costs are from 1977 Federal Reserve PACS Reports. Includes estimated overhead costs and the 16-
percent markup.
2. Estimated minimum long-run average costs for cheekand currency services are from the equations reported on
Table 2. The 16-percent mark-up is added to the minimum-cost estimate.
3. Correspondent prices are from the 1977 Account Analysis Survey. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
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essentially it mandates Federal Reserve
System to provide services as if it were a pri-
vate
To maintain long-run competitiveness,
Reserve Banks will have to overcome disad-
vantages associated with pricing - including
the use ofaverage cost pricing, which leads to a
single price for each type of customer. While
the price to all users in a specific region or
group must be the same, the cost
services to all those users will not be the same.
Costs can vary among customers depending
upon customer's location, volume, or
other factors. For example, although checks
will be broken down into types for
purposes, pricing at a
derived for each type will mean over-
chfug:ing of low-cost users and undercl1,arjging
The correspondent-banking environment of
the 1980's, in the aftermath of the Monetary
Control Act, should be increasingly competi-
tive and more efficient. Competition may lead
to some contraction in the amount ofcorres-
pondent services provided by Reserve Banks
to member banks, as pricing eliminates the
former element ofsubsidy. On the other
Reserve Banks will be able to compete for the
insltitutiOtlS that nrf~v!(msjlv
access to their services. Over time, production
ofthese services shouldbecome more efficient
as purchasers shift to lower-priced suppliers,
regardless of whether those suppliers are pri-
vate correspondents or Reserve Banks.
Despite the increases in competition and
efficiency, prices most ofcorrespon-
dent services will rise in the short-run. Res-
pondent banks will experience higher costs
because of the elimination of subsidized
Reserve Bank services. Obviously, respondent
banks that formerly used free services will
have to reevaluate the relative costs ofprovid-
ing services internally, or of purchasing them
from correspondents and/or Reserve Banks.
Correspondent banks that formerly used
Federal· Reserve services for their own and
their respondents' benefit also will have to
reexamine their production ofcorrespondent-
banking services in light of the new Reserve
Bank charges. Thus, the MCA pricing scenario
implies higher costs of using most services,
whether provided directly by Reserve Banks,
or indirectly by correspondents using Reserve
Bank facilities.
the long-run, Federal
ability to operate likea private cornpe~tit<)r
depend on its ability to adapt to market condi-
tions,on costs to costs
and prices set by private competitors, and on
its future costs as affected by economies ordis-
economies of scale. Reserve Banks" pricing
decisions constrained by MCA; but
within those limits, they must develop market
strategies and internal pricing and accounting
systems. Their ability to compete also
on their ability to produce services in a man-
35services will rise, and Reserve Banks thus
could find it difficult to price services com-
petitively.
A second problem related to MCA imple-
mentation arises from the "postal service" or
"cream skimming" dilemma. According to
the "adequate level of service nationwide"
provision in the legislation, Reserve Banks
may be to provide correspondent ser-
vices to some customers whose location or
volume might not interest private producers.
these could boost
Reserve Banks costs substantially. They must
deal with the same type of problem faced by
the U.S. Postal Service, in providing a nation-
wide level ofservices at prices that ignore sub-
stantial differences in the cost of providing
similar services to different customers.
Correspondent banks could benefit signifi-
from the pricing of Reserve Bank ser-
vices. In this situation, correspondents will no
longer have to compete against "free" Federal
Reserve services - and they will also have
more flexibility in their operations than
Reserve Banks, which must operate under
MCA guidelines. Also, as in the past, corres-
pondents will offer a broader package of ser-
vices than Reserve Banks, such as loan partici ...
pations, cash management, and Federal funds.
Future of Check Clearing
In the check-clearing area, large Reserve
Bank facilities appear to be operating with
average costs well above the estimated
minimum average cost. This finding is not
surprising, given the expected overuse offree
check-clearing services provided by Reserve
Banks. The largest check-processing facilities
into the ofdiseconomies ofscale, or
increasing average cost - which suggests that
subject to market.pressures
expanded beyond the region of constant
returns to scale. In the post-MCA environ-
ment, these offices will have toreduce their
opl~ratlOns,or open facilities to take
advantage of lower average production costs
associated with medium-scale operations.. But
Reserve Banks and Branches operating in the
near minimum average cost should be
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able to compete with correspondents on fairly
equal terms.
With their overall price advantage on check
services, Federal Reserve facilities should
maintain a strong competitive position in the
paper-check transfer market. The advantage is
rather slight, however, so that the Fed cannot
simply offer the service and let the market res-
pond. Because their market is no longer
assured, Reserve Banks must remain cog-
nizant ofthe types ofservices provided by cor-
respondents, and how those services are
priced.
In the long-run, despite restrictions imposed
by the MCA, Reserve Banks should continue
to playa central role in the nation's payments
system. And in the short-run, despite the
impact of output changes on prices for check-
clearing services, most Reserve Banks should
be able to weather the shift to a pricing
environment. For facilities operating in the
range of relatively constant costs, even large
changes in volume will not result in dramatic
shifts in average costs, and hence in prices.
Thus, Reserve Banks generally should survive
the pricing-adjustment period successfully.
Future of ACH Services
The Federal Reserve faces a dilemma with
respect to the pricing ofACH services - that
is, the difficulty of setting an appropriate
"long-run" price for this service that exhibits
falling long-run average costs. In addition,
despite the tendency for per unit average costs
to fall in line with rising output, in 1977 the
average cost per image (7.3 cents) far
exceeded the average cost per check cleared
0.87 cents). That large gap still exists today.
This differential could influence users to shift
back to paper checks, unless other processin&
costs for ACH transfers remain well below
comparable check costs.
The Federal Reserve, in its August 1980
proposals, thus based its proposed ACHprices
on estimated long-run average costs at a much
higher volume ofoutput. As a result, the price
per ACH transfer fell below the price per
check. But despite the evidence from our 1977
study, significant economies ofscale for ACHoperations may not continue indefinitely. So
the future of this market could hinge on the
prices set by the Federal Reserve. Too high a
price could hamper the growth ofthe develop-
ing market for private ACH transfers, which
now account for only one-fifth ofthe market.
(Government transfers, which now account
for the vast bulk of all transfers, will not be
priced explicitly,) Too Iowa price, on the other
hand, could create a large subsidy for the users
of the Fed system, and again could retard
development ofa competitive private system.
Future of Cash Services
While pricing could lower Reserve Bank
volumes for most services, it may actually
increase the amount of coin and currency
activity. The Federal Reserve's pricing pro-
posals cover only transportation expenses -
nearly one-third ofthe total for both coin and
currency - so that Reserve Banks will con-
tinue to have an advantage over correspon-
dents on the "price" for cash handling. With
the opening ofReserve Banks' services to non-
member banks and other depository institu-
tions, the Fed may actually experience an
increase in volume in this activity. But while
handling more currency and coin, Reserve
Banks probably will provide fewer transporta-
tion services, since pricing eliminates the sub-
sidy in this area.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
The inefficiencies and competitive barriers
previously associated with the provision of
correspondent-banking services helped bring
about the enactment ofthe Depository Institu-
tions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act.
The pricing and access provisions of the Act
were designed to rectify the major inefficiency
in the nation's correspondent-banking market
- the provision of free Federal Reserve ser-
vices to member banks. Simultaneously, the
Act attempted to strengthen competition
among the suppliers of these services. The
implementation ofthe Act over the next year
will strongly influence thefuture ofthe corres-
pondent-banking industry.
The overconsumption offree Reserve Bank
services by member banks has led to overpro-
duction by the public sector in general,and by
some Reserve Bank facilities in particular.
"Full cost" pricing as implemented under the
MCAwiHnot eliminate all ofthe subsidies to
institutions using Fed services. However,·it
will provide Reserve Bank customers with
markefsignals concerningthe true cost ofthe
resources they consume, providing strong
incentives for more efficient use of the Ser-
vices produced.
The MCA was also designed to promote
competition among suppliers ofcorrespondent
services by eliminating the segmentation of
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the market between member banks and other
institutions. After implementation, all institu-
tions will have access to Reserve Bank ser-
vices, but ofcourse at a price.
The post-MCA world will be both more
competitive and efficient as a result ofthe par-
tial or complete elimination of Federal
Reserve subsidies to depository institutions.
Removal of the check-processing and cash-
transportation subsidies will allow private pro-
ducers to compete on a more equal footing
with Reserve Banks. Forthat matter, increased
competition is also indicated by the evident
lack ofa natural Federal Reserve monopoly in
check-processing or cash-handling services. In
addition, historical data indicate that the
charges Reserve Banks •must set for their
check services are comparable to the fees cor-
respondents charged for similar services. In
the long-run, competition from the private
sector will probably .erode the Federal
Reserve's market share, butthat competition
should also spur Reserve Banks to produce at a
more efficient scale ofoperations, leading to
lower pricesand higher quality ofservices.
In the ACH area, the Federal Reserve's
published pricing schedule indicates a short-
run willingness to continue subsidies, so that
the· market grows sufficiently for Reserve
Banks to take advantage oftheir economies ofscale in this area. This would permit lower
ACH transfer costs, making them more com-
petitive with check clearing costs, and thereby
helping to reduce the burden on the nation's
check-payments system.
In the 1980's, therefore, the Federal
Reserve System should continue as a primary
producer, especially of check and ACH ser-
vices. However, its overall role will be affected
by the economy's increased reliance on the
private sector for correspondent-banking ser-
vices.
FOOTNOTES
1. Nonmember banks had access to Regional Check
Processing Centers (RCPC's); access to Automated
Clearinghouse (ACH) was open to all institutions.
2. The subject is covered in the following studies:
R. Alton Gilbert, "Utilization of Federal Reserve Bank
Services by Member Banks: Implications for the
Costs and Benefits of Membership," Review (Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, August 1977).
Susan R. Hume and Katherine S. Russell, "A Study of
the Relative Usage of Federal Reserve Services by
Member Banks in the Second Federal Reserve Dis-
trict," unpublished article (Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, January 1978).
Bruce J. Summers, "Required Reserves, Correspon-
dent Balances and Cash Asset Positions of Member
and Nonmember Banks: Evidence from the Fifth
Federal Reserve District," Working Paper 78-3
(Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, April 1978).
3. A preliminary analysis of 1979 PACS data and
correspondent-bank account analysis data indicates
little change in the relationship between correspon-
dent prices and average costs.
4. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, "Federal
Reserve Services," 1978, p. 3.
5. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 1917 PACS Expense Report, Annual Detail
Reports, (Washington D.C.: Federal Reserve Board,
1978), PI'. 83-165; and 1917PACS Expense Report,
Annual Summary Report, (Washington, D.C.: Federal
Reserve Board, 1978).
6. U.S. Congress, Public Law 96-221, Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
of 1980 (96th Congress, March 31, 1980), SectiOn
11 A, Pricing of Services.
7. These two items, imputed taxes and the imputed
return to capital, are estimated by the· Federal
Reserve Board of Governors to be 16 percent of total
costs. This provides the private-sector adjustment
factor.
8. Federal Reserve Press Release, "Proposals for
Pricing Federal Reserve Services" (Washington D.C.:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
August 28, 1980), 1'.4.
9. Wall Street Journal, "Fed's Plan to End Free
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Preston J. Miller, "The Right Way to Price Federal
Reserve Services," Quarterly Review (Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Summer 1977), p. 20.
10. A preliminary evaluation of 1979 data indicates
that similar long-run average cost curves continue to
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cost less transportation expenses; average produc-
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Fourth Quarter, 1977, Federal Reserve Evaluation
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ference of First Vice Presidents, PI'. 66-68. Since
these measurements were not statistically signifi-
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and ACH equations presented in Table 2.
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14. David B. Humphrey, "Economies to Scale in
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